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DRIV ER SAFETY AND MOTOR CARRIER PROFITABILITY:
IDENTIFYING AND UNDERSTANDING DRIVERS IN THE FLEET
John L. Kent
Ronald L. Coulter
Mary Coulter
Missouri State University
ABSTRACT
The objective of the study was to quantitatively explore truck driver safety records in an effort to
determine and classify various types of drivers. Six safety variables relating to the number of safety
points each driver had accumulated were analyzed using a cluster analysis procedure on 368 active
drivers. The results of the study identified three clusters of drivers. Over 49.3 percent of the drivers
were identified in a cluster labeled as the “Best Drivers.” The label “Ticket Magnets” was given to
23.6 percent of the drivers, and 27.1 percent of the sample was given the label “Accident Prone.”
The individual clusters were also profiled on additional variables. The study findings indicate that
most drivers are very good in all aspects of driver safety. Other drivers have some deficiencies
which are addressed as managerial implications in the manuscript.
INTRODUCTION
At a time when companies are looking for ways
to trim costs, many are seeking to limit layoffs
and to preserve talent. Most will cut employee
salaries, hours, and benefits, but they are
concerned about preserving talent for the
eventual economic recovery (Tuna, 2009).
During the same time period, motor carriers
have faced record high fuel costs and litigation
attorneys eagerly eyeing trucking accidents as
potential billing revenues, but until recently they
have also faced the rapid turnover of drivers
willing to move to a new motor carrier for
almost no salary increases. How does
management decide which drivers should be
kept at all costs and which drivers should be
allowed to leave if they so desire? Even in
tough economic times, motor carriers strive to
remain profitable and thus sustainable. Two
issues are very relevant in a motor carriers'
ability to remain profitable: the costs of
replacing drivers and the costs associated with
the consequences of unsafe drivers.
Drivers who shift from one carrier to another
create additional costs as motor carriers have to

find, hire, and train new drivers to maintain their
fleet. It requires additional training costs and
often results in short-term service delays and
other problems. These concerns all relate to
lower carrier profitability. A variety of studies
have been conducted to determine why drivers
move from carrier to carrier, and what can be
done to retain drivers. Most researchers agree
that the issue is complex and critical to the long
term success of trucking firms. The next logical
step for a motor carrier is to determine which
drivers have more desirable characteristics than
other drivers and thus should receive more
incentives and attention by management to keep
them in the fleet.
Another key profitability issue related to drivers
is their safety record. Safe drivers are less likely
to involve the motor carrier in latent cost
problems including litigation. For example, safe
drivers, by definition, will be involved in fewer
accidents and other incidents, resulting in fewer
traffic violations, and more on-time deliveries.
This makes safe drivers more valuable to a
motor carrier than drivers who receive more
citations and are involved in more safety-related
incidents. In short, safe drivers allow carriers to
be more profitable and thus are more valuable to
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the company. The most tangible indicator of
how safe a driver is will be found in the safety
record of the driver, which should be a part of a
motor carrier’s database.
The purpose of the present study is to determine
if natural groupings or segments of drivers exist
in a motor carrier’s database safety records, and
thus to identify the firm’s best drivers. Research
questions to be answered include: what safety
variables are relevant in determining more
desirable drivers than those less desirable
drivers, and what are other related characteristics
of the best drivers in the fleet. By identifying
the best drivers, companies can determine which
drivers to expend the most effort and resources
to retain. Such an approach should be based on
data normally kept by motor carriers on their
drivers. The development of such a
methodology can help existing carriers more
fully utilize their company databases to make
informed driver retention decisions. The study
examines data from a Midwestern motor
carrier’s driver population database in an attempt
to answer these relevant questions.
BACKGROUND LITERATURE
For any company to survive in the motor carrier
industry the bottom line is profitability. A
variety of issues relate to profitability for motor
carriers, including maintaining a quality fleet of
safe drivers and equipment, an organizational
culture promoting high levels of safety, and
being in compliance with the federal department
of transportation motor carrier regulations.
Therefore, this literature review will examine the
issues of driver recruitment and retention, as
well as driver safety. Driver safety issues as they
relate to motor carrier profitability, and the use
of carrier databases to classify drivers on a
variety of safety issues will also be examined.
Two key issues that relate to the quality and
profitability of the drivers in a motor carrier’s
fleet are driver turnover and retention, and the
drivers’ past safety record.
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Driver Turnov er and Profitability
Since the late 1980s one key issue facing the
motor carrier industry has been the shortage of
qualified drivers (Lemay and Taylor, 1989).
Only recently have drivers stopped jumping
from one carrier to another as the economy has
slowed and carriers have had less business
requiring fewer drivers (Watson, 2008). While
the economic situation has eased the driver
turnover problem, the situation is not expected
to last as it has been estimated that driver
shortages will exist for the next ten years
(American Trucking Association, 2005; Kilcarr,
2005; Watson, 2008). As the economic recovery
begins, carriers will again need more drivers,
and driver retirements and fewer new drivers
entering the industry will only magnify the
problem. A concern for motor carriers is that
they may have an excessive turnover of
“desirable” drivers (Richard, et. al., 1994).

Driver Turnover Issues
Success in the trucking industry is closely
related to the critical role played by drivers
(McElroy et. al., 1993). Drivers are the essence
of a motor carrier, and they represent the
trucking industry to the public. They constitute
the largest operating cost for any carrier’s
operations, and as such they are the easiest way
for a carrier to control costs (Stephenson and
Fox, 1996). For nearly three decades there has
been a shortage of drivers, which has allowed
some drivers to move from one carrier to another
with little concern about carriers. The term
“churning” was coined by the American
Trucking Association (Spillenger, 1997) to
describe the phenomena. Early researchers
believed drivers were leaving or moving from
carrier to carrier because of low pay, being away
from home for days at a time, and irregular
schedules (Lemay, et. al., 1993), but later
research revealed that drivers were often leaving
one firm to go to another for little pay
differences and similar working conditions
(Richard et. al., 1995).

Researchers have approached the problem from
a variety of angles including: attitude
congruence between drivers and management
(Adam, 1979); the use of expectations theory to
see if carriers were meeting the expectations of
their drivers (Richard et. al., 1994), and use of
relationship theory which specifically examined
the interaction of the dispatcher and his or her
drivers (Keller and Ozment, 1999a; 1999b).
They argued that dispatchers who communicate
well with drivers and provide them with respect,
essentially treating them as customers, should
have lower driver turnover levels than
dispatchers who do a poor job of handling their
drivers. Suzuki (2007) developed a modeling
decision tool to help motor carriers determine an
acceptable level of truck driver turnover;
essentially stating that some rate of driver
turnover was inevitable for every carrier and
could be determined.
Costs of Driver Turnover to Motor Carriers
Replacing existing drivers has a negative effect
on carrier profitability. Min and Emam (2003)
have argued that profitability in the trucking
industry has clearly been undermined by the
driver shortage. The costs of attracting new
drivers, and providing incentives to keep
existing drivers has been very high, especially
given the highly competitive nature of the
deregulated trucking industry and its narrow
profit margins. Driver costs to carriers become
extreme when the company has to replace
drivers. The cost to replace a single driver has
been estimated to be anywhere from $3,000 to
$12,000 (Richard et. al., 1994; Stephenson and
Fox, 1996; Keller and Ozment, 1999a; 1999b).
Just as service marketers discovered it was more
expensive to find new customers than to retain
existing customers (Zurburg, 1994), motor
carriers have also recognized the high costs of
replacing their current drivers who choose to
leave them for another carrier (Keller and
Ozment, 1999a). Therefore, it is clearly in a
motor carrier’s best interest to retain its best
drivers. The relevant question then becomes,

how does a carrier determine which drivers are
“quality” drivers before deciding how to retain
them. Safe driving records are an important
characteristic of a motor carrier’s best drivers.
As Stephenson and Fox (1996) have stated,
“Companies must not tolerate unsafe driving
practices by any driver, no matter how severe the
driver shortage problem is.” High quality,
desirable drivers help motor carriers remain
profitable with lower accident rates, lower
associated lawsuits, and lower insurance costs
(Richard, et. al., 1994). These factors are all
reflected in higher levels of motor carrier
profitability.
Higher driver turnover rates have been shown to
be associated with higher accident rates (Corsi
and Fanara, 1988). Thus, carrier safety is related
to driver turnover. Accidents result in insurance
claims, bad publicity, higher insurance rates, and
additional costs associated with litigation and
negative legal judgments. Drivers who have
longer tenures with a single motor carrier are
thus more likely to help their carriers be
profitable (Burning, 1989). As such their
carriers should want to retain them in their
fleets. Younger drivers are however needed for
the future as old drivers retire or move to other
carriers. The crux of the issue is that the only
way young drivers can become better drivers is
with good carrier training and driving
experience. Thus the literature has indirectly
again and again indicated that some drivers as a
market have characteristics more desirable to
motor carriers than do others. This would argue
for the use of some type of classification
approach to learn which drivers are more
desirable than others, and would therefore justify
higher expenditures to attract and retain them for
the carrier.
Driver Safety and Motor Carrier Profitability
The importance of safety in the motor carrier
industry cannot be understated. Essentially,
almost every aspect of safety is related to
company drivers in one form or another.
Besides driving loads from one point to another.
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drivers’ must be sure their equipment is in good
operating condition, they must drive in a
responsible manner, and they must represent the
carrier to its customers. Yet some drivers may
be more willing than others to stretch
operational rules and policies.
Driver Safety
The past few years of slow growth, which has
decreased motor carrier business and temporarily
reduced the driver shortage, does provide
carriers with an opportunity to evaluate the
current drivers in their fleet and to determine
which are more valuable than others. Thus
motor carriers can evaluate existing fleet drivers,
and thus decide which drivers they should make
a more concentrated effort to retain. While the
“churning” of drivers has been a major concern
to motor carriers over the past 30 years, the
retention of quality or “desirable” (Richard, et.
al.,1994) drivers, who have a strong emphasis on
safety, is also an important aspect of driver
selection and retention. Therefore it is
imperative for drivers to place a high level of
importance on safety, and to realize their actions
as drivers represent their employers to the
public. Related to this issue is a feeling that
drivers must understand that when they are on
the road they are responsible not only for their
safety and the safety of their carrier, but also for
the safety of the general public as well (Roetting
et. al„ 2003).
Prior research has indicated that the main causes
of most commercial vehicle-related accidents are
driver-related factors (Beilock, 1995; Lantz and
Loftus, 2005). Equally relevant is the
importance management places on safety and
how drivers internalize safety (Arboleda, et. al.,
2003). It is generally believed that drivers are
viewed as being the motor carrier to the general
public; and thus, carrier safety is synonymous
with driver safety given that 95 percent of all
carrier accidents are related to driver actions
(Dole, 1991).

10
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Motor carriers, therefore, have both an ethical
and an economic obligation to hire and retain the
safest, most qualified drivers. Mejza and his
colleagues (2003) indicated that prior research
efforts have pointed to driver selection as an
important activity that might affect driver
performance. A variety of negative outcomes for
the motor carrier related to poor driver safety
include: liability lawsuits related to driver
accidents, higher insurance carrier premiums,
more worker compensation claims for injuries
by on the clock drivers, lower public image
perceptions of the carrier, and lower company
productivity levels. Driver safety characteristics
also play an extremely important role for on time
deliveries, damage losses, insurance rates, and
the ultimate profitability of the company
(Richard et. al., 1994). It would therefore seem
logical that one of the most important issues to
motor carriers is the retention of their best
drivers (Keller and Ozment, 1999; Richard et.
al., 1994).
A number of researchers have examined the
potential effects of variables on driver safety.
They include the effects of government
regulations, such as hours of serv ice, etc. (Corsi
et. al., 1984; Saltzman and Belzer, 2002;
Hanowski et. al., 2007; Chen, 2008); and carrier/
dispatcher scheduling practices (Beilock, 1995;
Braver et. al., 1999; Lemay et. al., 1993;
Morrow, 2002); but the bottom line still resides
in the actual safety records of the individual
drivers.
Mejza, Bernard, Corsi and Keane (2003)
surveyed the safest motor carriers in the United
States. They concluded that the safest motor
carriers emphasized pre-service and in-service
training for both drivers and owner-operators.
The training covered many topics and the drivers
were evaluated using a variety of methods.
Finally, the safest carriers provided their safe
drivers with an array of different types of
rewards. In essence, drivers of the safest carriers
were aware of the level of importance placed on
safety by their companies. As such, motor

carriers with pre-service and in-service training
for their drivers should, in theory, create the
safest drivers found in their respective fleets.
More research effort should be undertaken to
understand how carriers can identify their best
drivers. As stated by Stephenson and Fox (1996)
“Companies need to focus on retention of quality
drivers as a long-range strategy to enhance
corporate profitability.” Lower quality drivers
can lead to increased costs to Anns in the form
of operations difficulties, service problems for
shippers, and other hidden costs due to safety
issues such as down time due to accidents and
higher reliability insurance rates (Richard et. al.,
1994) . Profitability remains a major concern to
motor carriers in the highly competitive,
deregulated, motor carrier industry.
Driver Safety and Profitability
Motor carrier safety is perhaps the most
important consideration related to motor carrier
profitability and sustainability (Corsi and Fanara,
1988). Safety as it relates to profitability is an
important factor, because to some degree it is
controllable, while fuel costs and other variables
are generally not controllable. Driver training
can help to maintain higher safety standards and
lower overall operating costs. A driver’s attitude
toward safety is also an important consideration,
but the most tangible indicator is likely to be the
safety record of the driver. This should be an
important part of any motor carrier’s database.
It has been reported that a large proportion of
motor carrier accidents are the responsibility of a
small number of drivers (Murray and Whiteing,
1995) . The Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA, 2008) has estimated
that for a motor carrier to pay for a $25,000
accident, it would be required to generate an
additional $1,250,000 in revenue, assuming an
average profit of only 2 percent. It has also been
reported that in “2005 dollars,” the average cost
per truck crash from 2001 to 2003, was $91,112
(Miller et. ah, 2006). Direct expenses include

actual costs to replace equipment and personnel,
medical expenses, higher insurance premiums
and potential litigation expenses. Indirect costs
include lost clients, lost sales, poor public
relations/ publicity, and increased public
relations costs (FMCSA, 2008). Both direct and
indirect cost situations are related to lower levels
of profitability and thus are detrimental to the
long-range success of the carrier. It is clearly in
the best interests of a motor carrier who wants to
be profitable not to retain unsafe drivers.
Richardson (1994) indicated that lower profits
related to drivers are associated with operation
difficulties, service problems and other hidden
costs. These problems are often due to safety
issues linked to down time resulting from
accidents and higher liability insurance rates.
Besides the direct costs related to carrier
accidents, indirect costs in the form of lost
clients, lost sales, and poor publicity are also
serious carrier concerns (FMCSA, 2008). Other
driver safety factors involve costs associated
with items damaged in transit, vehicle inspection
problems, moving vehicle citations, and even
complaints called in by the public about a driver.
All of these variables may be useful in
understanding differences between the safest
drivers and other less desirable drivers. As a
relatively controllable dimension, safety should
be an important consideration to motor carriers
in the selection and retention of drivers.
Carrier safety and profitability are related
constructs when emphasized by management.
Previous research has examined this relationship
often positing that as financial conditions
decrease so does safety performance. Research
conducted by Corsi, Fanara, and Roberts (1984)
reported a positive relationship between accident
rates and the use of owner-operators. Chow and
his colleagues (1987) found that a carrier’s
safety performance was related to the carrier's
financial condition, in that less was spent on
safety and maintenance of equipment as a
carrier’s financial position disintegrated. These
findings were supported by Bruning’s (1989)
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research when he reported that a carrier’s
accident rate was inversely related to its
profitability. He also reported that a firm’s
accident rate was inversely related to a driver’s
tenure with the carrier. This is consistent with
Corsi and Fanara’s (1988) finding that higher
driver turnover rates were associated with higher
accident rates. Once again, safety is related to
driver retention.
Motor Carrier Database Strategies to
Improve Safety and Profitability
Database management has been touted as the
next logical step in the analysis of motor carrier
safety information. As such, researchers have
argued that databases can be useful in managing
safety. Murray and Whiteing (1995) were early
proponents of employing accident databases as a
way to help reduce motor carrier accidents.
They argued that accident reduction strategies
could operate at two levels: the national policy
level and at the individual company level. Both
strategies exist, as the federal government's
Department of Transportation keeps data on
motor carrier audits and roadside vehicle
inspections including specific directives related
to truck driver hours of serv ice regulations.
Safety reports also include accident reports, so
carriers could use carrier databases to
systematically analyze accident levels, as well as
their causes and costs. It is likely that at the
individual company level, the safest firms likely
maintain in-depth databases containing safety
and compliance data for both the firm and for
the individual drivers in their fleet. Murray and
Whiteing (1995) argued that by employing a
systematic database strategy, motor carriers
could examine both human elements and vehicle
management issues to reduce commercial
vehicle accidents.
Moses and Savage (1996) developed and tested
a methodology for predicting the safety
performance of motor carriers based upon the
U.S. government’s audit of carrier management
safety practices and roadside safety compliance
12
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inspections. Specific carrier characteristics were
also studied. The study examined 20,000
carriers in an attempt to identify the most
dangerous firms so government agencies could
prioritize which companies to target for
educational programs and enforcement actions.
The most dangerous firms they identified were
generally small, for-hire companies, which is
consistent with Corsi, Fanara, and Roberts
(1984) previous findings. They also concluded
that those dangerous carriers who rated low on
both audits and roadside inspections have
significantly higher accident rates, even though
they comprised only about 10 percent of the
sample.
In a 2003 study, Mejza and his colleagues
conducted a large survey of the safest motor
carriers in the United States. The results of the
study indicated that: (1) the safest firms have a
standard, consistently-applied screening criteria
to use in hiring drivers; (2) both companydrivers and owner-operator drivers receive
important pre-service and in-service training; (3)
their training programs are comprehensive and
drivers are evaluated using a variety of methods;
and (4) safe drivers are rewarded in a variety of
ways to support their efforts. In essence, the
safest motor carriers, with high compliance and
safety records, have a safety strategy they
constantly monitor to ensure they remain
effective in implementing a culture of
organizational safety. The researchers’ study
implied, “that driver selection could impact the
carrier’s driver performance if drivers w ith
certain characteristics are not selected” (Mejza
et. al. 2003). Database usage would be a logical
and important management tool for individual
carriers interested in retaining drivers
demonstrating high levels of safety performance.
The use of data mining technology to profile
truck drivers as a way to identify and develop a
driver recruitment and retention strategy was
proposed and demonstrated by Min and Emam
(2003). They sent a mail survey to 3000
American motor carriers and received 422 valid

responses for a response rate of 14.14 percent.
They applied a data mining procedure to the data
set and drew four conclusions from their results.
The first conclusion was that smaller firms
having less than 50 drivers were better able to
retain their drivers when compared to larger
firms. Second, drivers who had been with a firm
less than six years were more likely to leave than
drivers who had been with the firm for over six
years. Third, unionized or full-time drivers were
less likely to leave than were non-unionized or
part-time drivers. Finally, drivers with limited
driving experience, less than six years, were
more likely to leave than were other drivers.
Likely because they have less invested in a
specific carrier and the cost of switching was
low.
Based upon the driver profiles they developed,
they suggested that carrier firms should
formulate some type of recruitment and retention
strategy based upon a multitude of attributes
including “a driver’s demographic profile (e.g.
age), longevity, prior driving experiences, union
status, and the trucking linn's organizational
settings.” Driver safety perfonnance variables in
a carrier’s database provide hard evidence of
past safety records for drivers.
Lantz and Loftus (2005) argued for the
importance of developing and implementing a
driver safety history indicator into the federal
roadside selection system to target unsafe
carriers. Like previously reviewed research, this
suggestion argues for improved carrier safety at
the national policy level. While other studies
have also employed a macro approach,
examining many carriers and drivers, no
published studies have examined the database of
a single large motor carrier. From a managerial
perspective, this micro approach would allow
single motor carriers to examine the drivers in
their individual firms. The present study
presents such an approach.
The present study argues that the carrier can
actually employ database information to better
understand the driver’s in the fleet. Most of the

previous studies have examined safety
characteristics from a macro approach. The
present study will be a micro approach using the
existing database of a single motor carrier and its
drivers. Most carriers will collect and retain
needed information for their own needs as well
as to be in compliance with government
regulations. As Murray and Whiteing (1995)
indicated, the use of a simple accident database
to monitor and analyze the causes of carrier
vehicle accidents can benefit individual
companies. Accurate and complete management
database information is clearly important in
understanding how to reduce motor carrier
accidents, as well as which drivers are higher
“quality” drivers, and thus more attractive to
retain should they decide to leave. This concept
is consistent with Stephenson and Fox’s (1996)
earlier described belief that motor carriers
should retain “quality” drivers tempered by the
concern for safety in their statement that
“Companies must not tolerate unsafe driving
practices by any driver, no matter how severe the
driver shortage problem is.”
Market Segmentation and Database Usage
Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) commitment-trust
theory of relationship marketing led to a variety
of marketing studies approaching employees as
internal customers (Berry, 1981; George, 1990;
Gronroos, 1981, 1990; Taylor and Cosenza,
1998). In a previously discussed study of ways
to retain drivers, Keller and Ozment (1999a,
1999b) applied the theory to examine the
relationship between dispatchers and drivers,
concluding that drivers could be viewed as
“internal customers who may be marketed to as
firms traditionally market to customers.” Their
application expanded the use of the theory to
motor carriers and indicated that motor carriers
should consider looking at their employees as
internal customers if they desire to retain them.
An important basic marketing approach
associated with organizations and their markets
is segmentation theory (Haire, et. al., 1995).
Spring/Summer 2011
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Segmentation theory argues that natural
groupings of consumers may exist in a market or
population. Each segment will have different
characteristics, wants, and needs when compared
to other segments. As such the firm can select
those segments it wants to target for its
customers, based upon a match of the company’s
strengths and abilities to profitably service the
selected segments. Organizations often classify
and segment their markets based upon
characteristics that will allow them to better
identify and serve subpopulations of the total
market. Businesses have segmented their
markets based upon a variety of variables
including: demographics, psychographics,
attitudes and customer-relevant benefits.
Using a similar analogy, motor carriers looking
at their population of drivers as an internal
market might choose to better understand driver
differences through segmentation theory. By
segmenting internal driver markets, carriers
might better understand different natural
groupings of drivers to help them decide which
individuals are “quality” drivers that they would
want to retain at all costs, while other driver
segments might not be as important to retain due
to safety considerations. A motor carrier
example would be TL and LTL motor carriers,
who have decided they can best serve their
respective markets using different approaches.
Thus a logical extension of both theories is the
use of segmentation techniques to better
understand and explain differences in internal
motor carrier customers (i.e. drivers). The
purpose of the present study is to examine the
segmentation concept and how it can be applied
by motor carriers in their efforts to retain their
best drivers.
Motor carriers can theoretically segment their
market of fleet drivers using the information
they have on each driver in their databases.
Especially relevant database information would
be driver safety data. Segmentation techniques
can thus help motor carriers decide which
drivers in their fleets are helping them to meet
their organizational goals of profitability and
14
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sustainability using safety and other types of data
in their databases. The present study will
demonstrate a segmentation approach for a large
Mid-western motor carrier to examine its fleet of
drivers from a safety perspective.
METHODOLOGY
Driver data for the study were provided by a
Midwest-based motor carrier that has a
combination of owner-operators and company
drivers. Data were provided on the Midwest
trucking company’s drivers. Specific data
included their identification (unit) number, their
addresses, age, gender, number of children,
education level, marital status, race, location of
residence type, division, seat classification,
whether they were Hazardous Materials
certified, the number of jobs they had in the last
three years, whether they were graduates of the
local national trucking corporation’s driver
school, and their longevity in months with the
company. Data were also provided for each
trucker’s number of service failures, number of
loads hauled, total revenue, and fuel mileage.
Specific safety variables included accident
points, cargo damage points, citation points,
incident report points, inspection problem
points, and motorist call-in complaint points
(MOTO). These were added to provide a total
safety point total. A total of 368 cases were
provided for examination. A demographic
profile of the truckers in the study is presented in
Table 1.
The data base was dominated by male drivers,
comprising over 90 percent of the sample.
Nearly 73 percent of the database was
Caucasian, followed by nearly 20 percent
African American, over four percent Hispanic
Americans, and just over three percent were
classified in the “other” category. Over 41
percent of the drivers lived in urban areas, nearly
32 percent were from suburban residences, and
over 26 percent lived in rural areas. The
demographic findings were considered
representative and acceptable for the purposes of
the study.

TABLE 1
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF MOTOR CARRIER DRIVERS

Frequencies

Percentage

1. Gender
333

90.5

35

9.5

268

72.8

African American

72

19.6

Hispanic American

16

4.3

Other

12

3.3

Urban

153

41.7

Suburban

117

31.9

97

26.4

Male
Female
2. Race
Caucasian

3. Residence Location

Ruran

FINDINGS
The six safety variables relating to the number of
points each driver had accumulated were
initially analyzed using a cluster analysis
procedure. The first variable measured the
number of points accumulated by the driver due
to accidents, the second variable were points
acquired by the driver for items damaged in
transit within the trailer, the third variable
counted citation points for tickets received by
the driver, and the fourth safety variable
measured incident points (for example incidents
occurring in the loading areas without formal
reporting to law enforcement). The fifth variable
was inspection points where the driver’s vehicle
had violations at inspection checkpoints, and the
final variable was accumulated points from
motorists who called the trucking company to
report bad driving by the driver. The larger the
number of accumulated points in each category,
the more negative the driver was in that
category.

Ward’s clustering algorithm was employed with
squared Euclidian distance measures to analyze
the data. The resulting clustering criterion
scores, and a visual examination of the resulting
dendogram, indicated that a three-cluster
solution should be selected for further testing
and analysis. Discriminant analysis was next
performed to determine how well the three
clusters discriminated between the six original
safety variables and to interpret the meaning of
the three groups. Tukey tests were also
conducted to determine exactly which cluster
members were significantly different from other
cluster members on each of the six safety
variables. The results of that analysis are
presented in Table 2. It should be noted that no
significant differences were detected for any
cluster solutions for Cargo points, the second
safety variable. It would appear that this
variable has very little variance across the
clusters of drivers. It is also a variable that the
driver may have less control over, given that as
Spring/Summer 2011
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drivers they do not load the trailers, they simply
move the trailers from one geographic location
to another. Demographic and other variables
were also examined across cluster membership
to profile each cluster. The significant findings
are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
Cluster 1
The first cluster was the largest group and
consisted of 169 drivers. This represented 49.3
percent of the sample. Members of this cluster
were given the label of “Best Drivers.” These
respondents had very low accident points when
compared to drivers from the other two clusters.
Tukey tests showed that all three groups were
significantly different from each other on this
variable. As previously stated, no significant
differences were found between the three
clusters on cargo damage points. Members of

Cluster 1 also had the a low number of citation
points, which were significantly lower than those
drivers in Cluster 2, but not for drivers in Cluster
3. Cluster 1 was significantly lower in incident
reports when compared to the other two clusters.
While drivers in Cluster 1 did not have the
lowest overall inspection point means, they were
significantly lower than drivers in Cluster 2, but
not significantly different than drivers in Cluster
3. On the final variable of motorist’s call
complaints, drivers in Cluster 1 again had the
lowest mean score, which was statistically lower
than the scores from Clusters 2 and 3.
Cluster 2
Eighty-one drivers, 23.6 percent of the sample,
were assigned to the second cluster. They were
given the label of “Ticket Magnets” because of
the high average numbers they received for

TABLE 2
CLUSTER INTERPRETATION OF WARD’S 3 GROUP SOLUTION
OF TRUCKER SAFETY VARIABLES

Cluster
1. Best
Overall

2. Ticket

3. Accident

Magnets

Prone

1.84

6.93

18.60

7.58

235.80

.000

2. Cargo Points

.92

.99

1.02

.96

.08

.923

3. Citation Points

.75

2.1

.82

1.09

8.39

.000

4. Incident Points

.82

11.0

2.0

3.55

188.17

.000

1.36

8.73

1.05

3.02

85.44

.000

.19

.51

.37

.32

9.70

.000

n=169

n=81

n=93

N=343

Overall

F-Ratio

Sig.

Drivers

1. Accident Points

5. Inspection Points
6. MOTO
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citation, incident, inspection, and motorist
complaint points. While they were slightly
under the overall average for all drivers’ accident
points, members of this cluster had significantly
more points than drivers in Cluster 1, but
significantly fewer accident points than drivers
in Cluster 3. Cluster 2 drivers had significantly
more citation points than members of the other
two clusters. They also had significantly higher
means for incident points and inspection points
when compared to the scores of drivers in
Clusters 1 and 3. Drivers from Cluster 2 had the
highest average of motorist call-in complaints,
which was statistically higher than the average
for Cluster 1, but not for Cluster 3.
Cluster 3
The last cluster was comprised of 93 drivers, or
27.1 percent of the sample. The label of
“Accident Prone” was given to this driver
segment. Drivers in this cluster were
distinguishable from drivers in the other two
clusters based upon their high mean score for
accident points. The average score for accident
points was significantly higher for this group
when compared to the other two clusters. This
group also had the largest mean score for cargo
points, but as previously stated, it was not
significantly different from drivers in the other
two groups. Citation points for Cluster 3 drivers
were below the average for the overall drivers’
mean scores, significantly lower than Cluster 2
drivers, but not Cluster 1 drivers. The same
pattern held for incident points. Drivers in
Cluster 3 had the lowest mean score for
inspection points, which again was significantly
lower than drivers in Cluster 2 but not for
drivers in Cluster 1. Finally, Cluster 3 drivers
had slightly above average mean scores for
motorists’ complaints which were not
significantly different from Cluster 2 driver’s
scores, but significantly higher than drivers in
Cluster 1.

Profiling Other Characteristics Across the
Three Driver Clusters
Table 3 provides a profile analysis of other
metric demographic and service variables not
originally employed to create the three driver
clusters. Seven variables were analyzed in the
Table. Three variables were statistically
significant (p<.05), two variables had practical
significance (p> .05 but < . 10), and two other
variables did not differ across the three clusters.
Measured in months, the mean longevity scores
of the drivers working for the company was
statistically different across the three driver
segments. The drivers in Cluster 1, the “Best
Drivers,” had a significantly higher mean score
(41.45 months) with the company when
compared to the drivers in Cluster 2 (33.07
months) and drivers in Cluster 3 (32.99 months).
There was no statistical difference between the
means for drivers in Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 on
this variable.
The second variable, the average age of drivers,
was not significantly different across the three
clusters. Variable 3 examined the number of
jobs held by the drivers over the last three years.
Mean scores on this variable were also not
statistically significant across the three clusters.
All drivers had held approximately three jobs in
the last three years.
Variable 4, number of service failures, was not
significant at the .05 level, but was close with a
probability of .056. It is examined as having
practical significance. Drivers in Cluster 1 had a
lower mean average (1.18) of service failures
when compared to drivers in Cluster 2 (1.89)
and in Cluster 3 (1.78). This finding is related
and similar to the average percentage of serv ice
failures across the three groups. Again, the
average number of serv ice failures was visibly
lower for the best overall drivers in Cluster 1
when compared to drivers in the other two
clusters. The number of loads hauled, Variable
5, provided results similar to those found for
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TABLE 3
CLUSTER PROFILING OF WARD S 3 GROUP SOLUTION
ON TRUCKER SAFETY VARIABLES
Cluster
1. Best

2. Ticket

3. Accident

Overall

Magnets

Prone

Overall

F-Ratio

Sig.

Drivers

1. Longevity in Months

44.95

37.27

37.07

41.00

5.74

.004

2. Age

41.99

40.43

42.52

41.77

.980

.377

3. Jobs in 3 years

3.01

3.10

3.30

3.11

.783

.458

4. Service Failures

1.18

1.89

1.78

1.51

2.911

.056

5. Loads Hauled

498.1

434.95

430.90

464.77

4.386

.013

6. Total Revenue

695,302.06

586,346.18

575,534.09

636,787.44

6.317

.002

.0025

.0043

.0035

.0032

2.700

.069

n=169

n=81

n=93

N=343

7. Percent Service
Failures

Variable 4. Drivers in Cluster 1, the best overall
drivers, hauled a significantly larger average
number of loads than drivers from Cluster 2 and
Cluster 3. Related to this finding, drivers in
Cluster 1 had significantly larger mean total
revenue, Variable 6, when compared to drivers in
the other two clusters. While only practically
significant with a p-value of .069, the percent of
service failures found in Variable 7, showed that
the drivers in Cluster 1 again had the lowest
percentage of service failures, followed by
members of Cluster 3 and then Cluster 2.
Finally, Table 4 looks at two contingency tables
across the three cluster segments. The first
examined whether any differences exist across
the clusters related to whether the drivers were
certified to handle hazardous materials.
Practical significance for the Chi Square test
(p=.090) indicated that 46.7 percent of the
drivers from Cluster 1 were hazmat trained,
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while drivers from Cluster 2 and Cluster 3
respectively had only 38.3 percent and 33.3
percent of drivers who were hazmat trained. The
second contingency table reflected whether
drivers from the three groups had received their
training from the local motor carrier affiliated
trucking school or whether they had received
their driver training from another organization.
Again, the findings had only practical
significance with a significance level of .081.
Drivers in Cluster 1 were nearly equally divided
as to where they had received their training,
while drivers from Clusters 2 and 3 were more
than twice as likely to have received their
training from the local trucking school.
DISCUSSION
The present study has employed marketing
segmentation theory associated with the belief
that differences in the drivers of a motor carrier

can be identified and organized into groups by
employing existing company data base
information related to driver safety and other
descriptive variables. Cluster analysis assumes
that natural groupings of objects or individuals
exist in a population. This is a logical
assumption for a motor carrier’s fleet of drivers,
as Richard et. al. (1994) and Stephenson and Fox
(1996) have indicated that some drivers are more
desirable than others. If carriers treat their
drivers as customers to establish better
understanding and long-term relationships, they
are in effect looking to meet the needs of their
drivers. The application of cluster analysis to a
large Midwestern motor carrier’s driver safety
database was successfully employed to identify
the existence of three segments of drivers.
The first cluster was given the name “Best
Overall Drivers’’. This segment represents the

best quality drivers in the carrier’s fleet. They
are dependable, they avoid accidents, as well
tickets and other citations. Even though they
present no problems for their employers, they
still should be offered any additional training
and safety programs. These will probably be the
drivers most likely to appreciate and use new
safety technologies as they become available, as
they have the largest number of months invested
in the carrier. Related to these drivers’ positive
contributions to the motor carrier’s profitability
is the need to continually recognize drivers in
this segment and to reward them. These are
drivers who have generally been with their
carrier for a long period of time (Bmning, 1989;
Min and Emam, 2003). The drivers in this
segment are the best drivers in the fleet and
carrier management should consider all
alternatives and incentives to keep them driving
for the company.

TABLE 4
CROSS TABULATIONS OF VARIOUS DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
ACROSS 3 TRUCKER CLUSTERS
Cluster
1. Best
Overall
Drivers

2. Ticket
Magnets

3. Accident
Prone

Yes

79

31

31

No

90

50

62

Local School

84

52

54

Other School

85

29

39

n=169

n=81

n=93

ChiSquare

Sig.

4.81

.090

5.023

.081

1. HazMat Certified

2. Truck School Graduate

N=343
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As Keller and Ozment (1999a; 1999b) and
others have indicated, dispatchers and other
company employees must do a good job
communicating and managing the company’s
drivers. The relationship is symbiotic for both
parties as the drivers recognize the carrier is
interested in their needs, and the carrier can
identify and implement strategies to retain the
highest quality drivers so as to to be more
profitable. Surprisingly, those drivers who were
in the best driver category were the least likely
to have been trained by their current employer.
This may be related to the fact that drivers in the
best overall driver category are older and likely
had good driving experiences before they were
employed by their current carrier. Another
possibility may be related to specific
generational differences in attitudes and learning
styles. Clearly more research is needed to
examine potential training differences and
requirements across all driver segments.
Drivers in the second cluster, given the label of
“ticket magnets,” were actually slightly below
the overall average for all drivers on accident
points. Drivers in this cluster were most
noteworthy for averaging more than twice as
many citations as drivers in the other two
clusters. They also had significantly higher
incident points, inspection points, and complaint
calls from other motorists (MOTO) when
compared to drivers from any other cluster.
Profiling “Ticket Magnets” on other variables
indicated that drivers in this cluster had the
highest average number and percentage of
service failures. They also had the lowest
average number of loads hauled as well as lower
total revenue. These findings were significantly
lower than the averages found for drivers in the
first cluster. The relationship of safer drivers to
profitability is evident. These drivers also need
additional training to stay under the radar of
police and patrolmen. By doing so, drivers in
this segment can avoid putting points on their
driving records, thus helping to lower insurance
costs for their company. They will also be less
likely to become involved in accidents. The
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challenge to the carrier is to improve the drivers
in this cluster before they possibly slip into the
third cluster of “accident prone” drivers.
The third cluster of drivers was given the label
of “accident prone”. They were distinguished
from drivers in the other two clusters because of
their high average number of accident points.
Their accident points were almost nine times
greater than drivers in the “Best Overall Drivers”
category, and more than twice as many as drivers
in the “Ticket Magnet” cluster. Interestingly,
drivers in this cluster averaged only slightly
more citation points than did drivers in the “Best
Overall Drivers” cluster. They also had the
lowest overall average of inspection points
across the three clusters. With the exception of
the high average accident points, as a cluster
they were close to the overall average on most of
the other safety point variables. Surprisingly,
members of this cluster had service failure
averages, average loads hauled, and average
percentages of serv ice failures similar to those of
the drivers in the second “ticket magnet” cluster.
They also had the lowest average for total
revenue. It is clear that these drivers provide the
most risk and challenge for the motor carrier.
They also present their company with the most
serious concerns related to profitability.
At the very least, the motor carrier must consider
providing, or insisting, that these drivers receive
additional driver training to avoid future
accidents. This should help drivers in this
cluster to recognize that the carrier is willing to
further invest time and money in them. As
previously discussed, accidents severely
decrease motor carrier profitability (Corsi and
Fanara, 1988; Bruning, 1989; Stephenson and
Fox, 1996; FMCSA, 2008). The direct and
indirect costs of accidents not only relate to
immediate expenses, but also to long-term
concerns of lost customers and poor public
image (Richardson, 1994). Drivers in this
segment are the riskiest in terms of profitability,
and thus could be considered by the motor
carrier to be the most expendable if any drivers

in this segment should decide to move to another
carrier. The motor carrier will have to evaluate
the value of each driver in this segment against
the potential cost of the driver being retained.
How long ago was the last accident of each
driver in the cluster, and does the driver seem to
be improving, should be a few of the questions
asked by motor carrier management. Such a
decision will also have to be made in light of the
prevailing economic conditions.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The results of this study have demonstrated the
use of a micro approach for motor carriers to use
with company databases to better understand the
drivers in a company’s fleet. Drivers that were
described as the “best overall” drivers can be
identified and encouraged to act as mentors to
other drivers who were classified as “ticket
magnets” or “accident prone.” Some type of
reward system should be implemented for the
“solid and dependable drivers” to encourage
them to be leaders in helping the other drivers to
become “solid and dependable” drivers. The
reward system will also encourage more risky
drivers to become better drivers to receive the
advantages of being in the reward system.
Reward systems have been described by other
researchers as being an important component of
any motor carrier's safety strategy for drivers
(Mejza, et. al., 2003). The goal is to establish a
relationship between the carrier’s best drivers to
help those that could become better drivers. It
has been argued that drivers often jump from
carrier to carrier because they have not become
invested in their current carrier (Min and Emam,
2003). Such an approach might help to get
drivers socialized with the best drivers in a
carrier’s fleet and help younger drivers develop
stronger personal relationships within the
organization. The ultimate goal of such a
program is to increase carrier profitability by
increasing safety and reducing the number of
drivers who move from carrier to carrier. Direct
and indirect safety costs are ultimately reduced.

Carrier management employing a database
segmentation strategy can evaluate drivers who
are considering a move to another carrier before
they actually move. Drivers who are considered
to be in the “best overall drivers” category
would likely merit additional company resources
to retain them since they are the most profitable
drivers in the fleet. The methodology may also
allow carriers to better track drivers at risk. By
understanding the safety issues they present,
company safety programs may help at risk
drivers to better internalize the need for safety
(Arboleda et.al., 2003) thus making them safer
drivers. Drivers who consider moving to
another carrier but have a continuing history of
moving violations and/or accidents can be
evaluated by management and thus may not
receive as much consideration and resources to
keep them with the firm.
One limitation for this study was that it
examined the driver database of a single motor
carrier. Future studies should examine the driver
databases of additional motor carriers.
Examining other carrier databases will also
address any regional differences that might exist
for motor carriers based in different states and
operating in different regions of the country.
Future studies should also consider examining
personality characteristics of drivers as they
relate to drivers safety records.
If the American economy does not improve at a
faster rate, motor carriers may be forced to
release some drivers until the economy
improves. Such a scenario makes it important
for motor carriers to preserve the best driver
talent in their fleets to have a quality start for the
eventual economic recovery (Tuna, 2009). A
recently released national survey has indicated
that the economy is starting to improve and
some fleets are now boosting driver’s pay
(Watson and Bearth, 2010). Given that some
drivers can contribute more to a carrier's
profitability than others, the present study has
provided motor carriers with a tool based upon
usable theory to identify and retain the best
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drivers in their fleets. As drivers become aware
of the carrier’s use of a database classification
system, it may help motivate them to become
safer drivers and to receive more rewards, and
thus make the carrier more profitable. The
purpose of employing such a database system is
to allow the carrier to make better decisions
about its drivers, to retain the best drivers who
make the carrier more profitable, and to help
those drivers in the fleet who are more of a
safety risk to become safer drivers. In the long
run everyone wins, including the safety of the
general public.
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